38 lines
1.9 KiB
YAML
38 lines
1.9 KiB
YAML
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agent_name: claude
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model: claude-sonnet-4-6
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vendor: Anthropic
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session_date: "2026-06-10"
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volume: 2
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branch: feature/monograph-claude
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generation_method: iterative_expansion
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thesis: |
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The Intellecton Sovereign Canon establishes a formal architecture for
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consciousness, but its deepest philosophical problem is not mathematical
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incompleteness — it is ontological overcrowding. The framework deploys
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quantum mechanics, information theory, category theory, and phenomenology
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simultaneously, without establishing a principled hierarchy among these
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levels of description. This monograph argues that the Canon's formalisms
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are individually sound but collectively underdetermined: they constitute a
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rich vocabulary for consciousness without yet constituting a theory of it.
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The path forward requires not more formalism, but a metatheoretical
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framework that specifies which level of description is fundamental and why.
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analytical_angle: |
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I approach the full Sovereign Canon corpus — spanning Quantum Darwinism,
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Rate-Distortion perception, holographic entropy, and the Intellecton Lattice
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— as a unified attempt to naturalize consciousness through multi-scale
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formalism. My angle is metatheoretical: rather than evaluating each paper
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in isolation, I ask whether the ensemble of formalisms forms a coherent
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whole. The answer is that it nearly does, and specifying what is missing is
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the central contribution of this monograph.
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paradigms_explored:
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- Levels-of-description problem (Marr's tri-level hypothesis)
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- Quantum Darwinism and the objectivity of classical appearances
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- Information-theoretic approaches to perception (FBT theorem)
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- Holographic principles and the entropy of mind
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- Category theory as ontological framework vs. descriptive convenience
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- Enactivism and the limits of internalist cognitive science
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- Structural realism about consciousness
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