\section{The Boundary Problem}

Volume 2 of the Intellecton Sovereign Canon begins from a formally attractive proposition: a minimal viable agent can be identified by a Markov blanket. The proposed system partitions states into internal states \(c\), sensory states \(s\), active states \(a\), and external states \(\lambda\). Sensory and active states jointly form a blanket \(b=(s,a)\), such that internal and external states are conditionally independent:

\[
p(c,\lambda\mid s,a)=p(c\mid s,a)p(\lambda\mid s,a).
\]

The importance of this equation should not be understated. If the factorization is valid, it provides a principled way to distinguish a system from its environment without appealing to an arbitrary spatial membrane. Internal states do not directly couple to external states; their relation is mediated by a boundary. This offers a formal vocabulary for individuation, and it explains why Markov blankets have become important in theoretical neuroscience, active inference, and philosophy of biology. The equation appears to answer an old metaphysical question in a modern mathematical idiom: where does an agent end and its world begin?

Yet the formal elegance of the answer can obscure the ambiguity of the question. "Boundary" names several different relations. A statistical boundary is a conditional independence relation in a probability distribution. A causal boundary constrains which interventions can directly change which variables. An operational boundary is maintained through the system's own activity. A phenomenal boundary separates what belongs to a subject's experience from what does not. These boundaries may coincide in some biological systems, but they are not equivalent by definition. The central philosophical task for Volume 2 is therefore not to establish that blankets exist. It is to determine which sort of boundary a Markov blanket establishes, and what further premises are required to move from that boundary to agency or consciousness.

A simple counterexample exposes the problem. Consider three variables arranged in a chain \(X\rightarrow B\rightarrow Y\). Conditional on \(B\), \(X\) and \(Y\) may be independent. The middle variable is a Markov blanket in a straightforward graphical sense, but no agent has thereby appeared. Likewise, a thermostat can have internal, sensory, active, and external variables. Its sensor mediates environmental temperature; its controller has internal states; its actuator changes the heater; its variables can be described using a blanket partition. Whether the thermostat is an agent, a minimal cognitive system, or a conscious subject remains unsettled. The blanket gives a useful decomposition, but it does not settle the ontology.

This underdetermination is not a defect unique to Volume 2. It reflects a general problem in attempts to derive ontological categories from mathematical structure. Mathematical models specify relations under chosen variables, scales, and probability distributions. Ontological conclusions require an account of why those variables and relations correspond to real units rather than convenient descriptions. A Markov blanket can be discovered in many systems, and different blankets can be drawn around overlapping variables. If every conditional independence identifies an agent, agency proliferates without discrimination. If only some blankets identify agents, the selection criterion must be supplied independently.

The master key grounds its variables in the canonical cortical microcircuit. Sensory states correspond to thalamocortical inputs, internal states to recurrent superficial and deep cortical populations, active states to deep outputs and corticothalamic feedback, and external states to environmental causes. This biological interpretation is more persuasive than an abstract graph because the variables have functional roles. Cortical populations integrate signals, generate predictions, and produce actions. Still, the mapping does not eliminate the boundary problem. A cortical column is embedded in larger cortical, subcortical, bodily, and environmental loops. Its apparent blanket depends on how these larger interactions are coarse-grained. A boundary around a column may be useful for one explanatory purpose and misleading for another.

The correct response is not to abandon the Markov blanket. It is to limit and then strengthen its role. The blanket should be understood as the first rung of a four-rung explanatory ladder.

The first rung is \textbf{statistical boundary}. At this level, a partition satisfies conditional independence under a specified model and scale. This identifies a candidate unit of analysis. It says that the blanket variables mediate the statistical dependence between internal and external variables.

The second rung is \textbf{causal autonomy}. Here the system does more than exhibit a partition. Its internal and active dynamics contribute counterfactually to maintaining the boundary under perturbation. If the environment changes, the system responds in ways that preserve some organization or viability condition. Causal autonomy requires interventions and temporal dynamics, not only a stationary distribution.

The third rung is \textbf{causal integration}. At this level, the internal organization has cause-effect powers that cannot be adequately decomposed into independent components. Volume 2 invokes Integrated Information Theory to establish this property. Integration may distinguish a recurrent cortical system from a feed-forward or merely insulated mechanism. But integration remains conceptually distinct from autonomy: a tightly integrated process can be destructive, transient, or externally controlled.

The fourth rung is \textbf{phenomenal subjecthood}. This is the strongest claim: the integrated autonomous process is not merely organized but is something for itself. Volume 2 approaches this claim through IIT, which treats intrinsic causal power as constitutive of consciousness. However, that constitutive identity is a philosophical thesis, not a consequence of conditional independence alone. It must be defended against alternatives that interpret integration as a correlate, enabling condition, or measure of complexity.

This ladder reveals both the promise and the risk of the Intellecton concept. The promise is that it joins statistical individuation, active inference, and intrinsic causal integration into a unified framework. The risk is equivocation: a proof at one rung may be narrated as if it established all subsequent rungs. A sparse precision matrix can support a Markov blanket without establishing self-maintenance. Recurrent covariance can indicate coupling without proving irreducible causal power. Positive integrated information, even if established, does not compel every philosophy of mind to identify the system with a phenomenal subject.

The term "minimum viable agent" must therefore be handled carefully. "Minimum" may refer to the smallest partition satisfying a formal criterion, the smallest system capable of adaptive regulation, or the smallest system capable of experience. These minima need not coincide. A minimal statistical blanket may be tiny and ubiquitous. A minimal autonomous system may require metabolism, memory, and action. A minimal phenomenal subject may require still other conditions. The very idea of a unique minimum is questionable because agency may be graded, multiscale, and context-dependent.

The philosophical reconstruction proposed here treats the intellecton not as an object enclosed by a blanket but as a process that maintains a boundary. This revision changes the explanatory direction. Instead of saying that a system is an agent because it has a Markov blanket, we ask whether a candidate system actively and repeatedly re-establishes a statistically identifiable separation from its environment. The blanket becomes evidence of an ongoing achievement. It is a trace of autonomous organization rather than a metaphysical certificate.

This process view also clarifies the role of the cortical microcircuit. A cortical column is not plausibly an isolated subject merely because a model yields conditional independence. Its relevance lies in the recurrent, action-guiding, and hierarchically embedded dynamics through which it participates in larger self-maintaining processes. The correct unit may shift with the phenomenon under study. Perceptual inference may be localized at one scale; organismic agency may require the whole brain-body system; social cognition may involve coupled agents without collapsing them into one subject.

Volume 2 should thus be read as opening the boundary problem rather than closing it. Its formal partition supplies a disciplined starting point for individuation. Its synthesis with IIT supplies a hypothesis about intrinsic unity. But the conceptual space between a statistical boundary and a subject remains substantial. The rest of this monograph develops the additional criteria needed to cross that space without erasing the distinctions that make the theory testable.

\subsection{Objections and Clarifications}

An advocate of a stronger reading might object that these distinctions impose philosophical demands foreign to the formal project. Perhaps the aim is only to define a minimal agent operationally, not to solve the metaphysics of subjecthood. This reply would be reasonable if the claims remained operational. But Volume 2 belongs to a Canon that treats the intellecton as a fundamental unit of recursive witness dynamics. Once a mathematical partition is asked to identify a witness, its ontological interpretation becomes unavoidable. The distinctions introduced here prevent central terms from changing meaning during the argument.

Another objection holds that conditional independence already captures a genuine form of inside and outside, and that any further demand merely reflects familiar biological intuitions. The response is that the boundary is genuine without being sufficient. A drainage basin, a cell, and a corporation can each admit meaningful inside-outside distinctions, but different conclusions follow. The point is not to reserve agency for organisms. It is to articulate additional properties that permit unfamiliar agents to be recognized for defensible reasons.

Finally, the four rungs should not be interpreted as a rigid developmental sequence. Boundary, autonomy, integration, and subjecthood can interact recursively. Internal integration can improve regulation; action can reshape a boundary; a changed boundary can alter integration. The ladder is analytical: it distinguishes questions while permitting reciprocal causation. The boundary problem is therefore not merely where to draw a line. It is how to justify the transition from a line in a model to a unit in ontology.
