\section{A Critical Process Ontology}

The preceding analysis has reconstructed Volume 2 around a simple but demanding principle: boundaries do not make subjects by themselves. A Markov blanket identifies a conditional independence structure at a chosen scale. Agency emerges when a process contributes to maintaining such a boundary under perturbation. Causal unity emerges when the organization resists decomposition under intervention. Phenomenal subjecthood remains a further philosophical and empirical question.

This reconstruction is critical because it rejects several tempting shortcuts. It rejects the inference from statistical separability to agency. It rejects the inference from recurrent covariance to intrinsic causal integration. It rejects the inference from positive integration to consciousness unless the constitutive premises of IIT are defended. Yet it is also constructive. It shows how the formal resources of Volume 2 can support a richer process ontology.

Process ontology treats enduring entities as relatively stable organizations of activity. An organism is not a static substance that happens to act; it is an ongoing achievement of metabolic, regulatory, perceptual, and behavioral processes. A neural subject is not a point hidden behind experience; it is a temporally structured organization through which a world is disclosed and action becomes possible. Boundaries are generated within these processes rather than imposed from outside.

The Markov blanket fits this ontology when interpreted dynamically. Its conditional independence relation describes a recurrent pattern of mediated coupling. Sensory and active states are not merely border variables. They are the channels through which a process selectively opens itself to an environment while preserving internal organization. The boundary exists through exchange.

This view differs from classical physicalism if physicalism is understood as the claim that subjects are reducible to observer-independent inventories of microphysical objects. The process account does not deny physical realization. It denies that individuation is exhausted by listing parts. An agent is identified through organizational, counterfactual, and temporal relations that may be multiply realized and scale-dependent.

The view also differs from unrestricted panpsychism. It does not infer subjecthood from mere existence or minimal causal interaction. Candidate subjects must exhibit a demanding conjunction of maintained boundary, autonomy, integration, and temporal organization. This does not solve every combination problem, but it prevents automatic proliferation of subjects wherever a conditional independence can be drawn.

The account is closest to enactivism, though it adds formal tools. Enactivism emphasizes autonomous sense-making: the organism brings forth a meaningful world through embodied activity. Markov blankets can formalize selective coupling; active inference can model regulation; IIT can investigate intrinsic causal unity. None replaces the enactive insight that agency is enacted through ongoing relations.

The revised intellecton is therefore not a particle. It is a scale-relative, temporally extended process whose boundary is counterfactually maintained and whose causal integration is robust under intervention. This definition can be stated compactly:

\[
\mathrm{Intellecton}_{\ell,T}
\iff
\left(
\mathcal{B}_{\ell}\leq\epsilon
\right)
\land
\left(
\mathcal{A}_{T}>\alpha
\right)
\land
\left(
\mathcal{R}_{\Phi}>\rho
\right)
\land
\left(
\mathcal{I}_{T}>\iota
\right),
\]

where the thresholds are empirically justified rather than metaphysically fixed. The formula is schematic. Its significance lies in the conjunction. No single metric is allowed to stand in for the whole.

The definition also makes exclusion conditions visible. A passive partition may satisfy \(\mathcal{B}_{\ell}\) but fail autonomy. A self-regulating but decomposable system may satisfy autonomy while failing robust integration. A transient integrated event may fail temporal identity. A system satisfying all formal criteria may still leave the phenomenal interpretation contested. This explicit incompleteness is a virtue because it keeps the framework open to evidence.

The relation between scale and subjecthood remains the most difficult problem. If multiple nested processes satisfy the criteria, are there multiple subjects, one dominant subject, or a hierarchy of partial agency? There may be no universal answer. Cells, organs, organisms, and groups exhibit different organizational closures. Subjecthood may require additional exclusion or coordination principles. The framework should treat this as a research question rather than resolve it through stipulation.

Volume 2's cortical microcircuit can now be placed appropriately. It is a plausible candidate locus of recurrent inference and causal integration. It may instantiate local intellecton-like organization. But the evidence currently supports calling it a component or candidate process more readily than a complete phenomenal subject. Its relationship to whole-brain and organismic boundaries must be measured.

This modesty does not diminish the Canon's ambition. On the contrary, it distinguishes a rigorous foundational theory from a vocabulary that explains everything too quickly. A theory gains power by making discriminations. The four-rung ladder distinguishes boundary, autonomy, integration, and subjecthood. The multiscale framework distinguishes local from global units. The temporal account distinguishes momentary structure from enduring agency.

The reconstruction also changes the meaning of sovereignty. A sovereign agent is not absolutely independent. Such independence would eliminate perception, action, and dependence on enabling conditions. Sovereignty is the capacity to regulate coupling, preserve organization, and transform oneself without dissolving into environmental dynamics. It is relational autonomy.

This relational sovereignty has ethical implications, though they exceed the present formal argument. If agency and subjecthood are graded, multiscale, and processual, moral consideration may not map cleanly onto species or substrate. But formal complexity alone should not decide moral status. The framework can inform ethical inquiry by identifying candidate autonomous and integrated processes, while ethical judgment must also consider vulnerability, interests, and forms of experience.

The final philosophical result is therefore neither reductive nor mystical. Statistical mechanics and causal modeling provide indispensable tools for identifying organized boundaries. Biology and enactivism explain how boundaries are maintained. IIT supplies a controversial but precise proposal about intrinsic unity. Phenomenology reminds us that subjecthood concerns appearance and lived world, not only external description. A mature Intellecton theory must hold these perspectives in productive tension.

Volume 2 began with the promise of a minimal viable agent bounded by a cortical Markov blanket. The strongest defensible conclusion is revised but substantial. A Markov blanket identifies a candidate locus of agency. When that boundary is actively maintained, historically continuous, and robustly integrated, it becomes a serious candidate for an intellecton. Whether it is a phenomenal subject requires further evidence and philosophical argument.

This conclusion turns the Markovian boundary from a static line into a dynamic achievement. The agent is not what lies behind the boundary. The agent is the organized process of drawing, maintaining, revising, and sometimes dissolving that boundary through time. That is the form in which Volume 2 can contribute most powerfully to a rigorous theory of recursive witness dynamics.

\subsection{Remaining Objections}

Three objections remain. First, the revised intellecton may seem no longer minimal because it includes too many conditions. But minimality is meaningful only relative to a target property. If the target is conditional independence, a blanket suffices. If the target is agency or subjecthood, additional conditions define the phenomenon. A smaller criterion that changes the subject is not more elegant.

Second, process ontology may appear to merely redescribe physical mechanisms. It introduces no immaterial substance, but redescription can identify real organizational invariants omitted by a parts list. Thermodynamics, computation, and evolutionary biology likewise describe patterns realized by microphysics without becoming dispensable. Process ontology identifies the level at which agency becomes intelligible and testable.

Third, phenomenal subjecthood remains unresolved. No responsible reconstruction should pretend otherwise. The framework narrows the candidate space and distinguishes rival explanations. It shows what boundary, autonomy, integration, and temporal identity contribute. Whether their conjunction is identical to experience or remains insufficient is the next problem.

This establishes the proper frontier for the Canon. Future volumes can investigate how witness dynamics propagate and how computational or holographic constraints shape subjects. Volume 2's role is foundational but limited: it explains how a candidate witness becomes bounded and organized. Its success should be judged by the precision and risk of that explanation, not by whether it settles every question at once.

The final position can be called critical process realism. It is realist because boundaries, autonomous organization, and causal integration are treated as discoverable features that constrain successful explanation. It is processual because these features exist through temporally extended activity rather than static substance. It is critical because every transition from formal result to ontological claim is exposed for examination.

Critical process realism also changes how disagreement should be handled. A physicalist may accept every empirical result while interpreting subjecthood as an emergent biological property. An IIT theorist may identify robust integration with experience. An enactivist may emphasize autonomous sense-making. The framework does not erase these differences. It provides shared formal and empirical ground on which their consequences can be compared.

The revised principle of Volume 2 is therefore precise: a Markov blanket is evidence for a candidate boundary; recursive maintenance makes it a candidate agent boundary; robust integration makes it a candidate intrinsic unit; temporal continuity makes it a candidate witness; phenomenal subjecthood remains a substantive hypothesis. This sequence is less rhetorically immediate than declaring the blanket an intellecton. It is also far more capable of supporting a durable research program.

Its restraint is not retreat. It is the condition under which the Canon's ambitious synthesis can become cumulative knowledge rather than a chain of suggestive analogies.
